## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

LORETTA DAVIS,	
Plaintiff,	
vs. )	<b>CIVIL NO. 05-628-GPM</b>
MERCK & CO., INC., STEELEVILLE ) PHARMACY, and MEDCO HEALTH )	
SOLUTIONS, INC.,	
Defendants. )	

## **MEMORANDUM AND ORDER**

## **MURPHY, Chief District Judge:**

This case was remanded to the Twentieth Judicial Circuit Court, St. Clair County, Illinois, on October 21, 2005. The Court found Plaintiff entitled to recover her costs in seeking remand to state court under *Garbie v. DaimlerChrysler Corporation*, 211 F.3d 407 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000), and ordered Plaintiff's counsel to file an affidavit setting forth the fees and costs incurred as a result of the removal on or before November 7, 2005. On November 7<sup>th</sup>, Plaintiff's counsel filed a motion for attorney fees, seeking \$1,820.00. Merck & Co., Inc. (Merck) filed a response on November 8<sup>th</sup> stating that, while it still believes that an award of fees and costs is inappropriate in this case, it specifically objects to Plaintiff's submission of \$220.00 for time spent responding to Merck's motion to stay, as it is not directly related to the remand.

On December 7, 2005, the United States Supreme Court decided *Martin v. Franklin Capital Corporation*, 126 S. Ct. 704, 708 (2005), which rejected the Seventh Circuit's standard that plaintiffs are presumptively entitled to an award of fees and held that "absent unusual circumstances,

attorney's fees should not be awarded when the removing party has an objectively reasonable basis

for removal." Notably, in its opposition to the remand motion, Merck objected to the imposition of

a fee award based on the fact that the Supreme Court would be deciding the *Martin* case (see Doc.

15, p. 15 n.4).

Having fully considered this matter, the Court finds that in light of the different approaches

taken by the various courts around the country to be confronted with these Vioxx cases, Merck had

an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal of this action. Therefore, an award of fees and

costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) is not appropriate. Martin, 126 S. Ct. at 711. Plaintiff's motion for

attorney fees (Doc. 20) is **DENIED**. That part of the October 21<sup>st</sup> Memorandum and Order awarding

Plaintiff her fees and costs in seeking remand is VACATED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 01/27/06

s/ G. Patrick Murphy

G. PATRICK MURPHY

Chief United States District Judge